more from Peter Unger

Single Idea 16070

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples]

Full Idea

Eliminativism is often associated with Unger, who defends 'mereological nihilism', that there are no composite objects (objects with proper parts); there are only mereological simples (with no proper parts). The nihilist denies statues and ships.

Gist of Idea

There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples


report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 4

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.11

A Reaction

The puzzle here is that he has a very clear notion of identity for the simples, but somehow bars combinations from having identity. So identity is simplicity? 'Complex identity' doesn't sound like an oxymoron. We're stuck if there are no simples.