more from William Lycan

Single Idea 15794

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions]

Full Idea

If a 'world' is understood as a set of sentences, then possibility may be understood as consistency, ...but this seems circular, in that 'consistency' of sentences cannot adequately be defined save in terms of possibility.

Gist of Idea

If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility


William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)

Book Reference

'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.302

A Reaction

[Carnap and Hintikka propose the view, Lewis 'Counterfactuals' p.85 objects] Worlds as sentences is not, of course, the same as worlds as propositions. There is a lot of circularity around in 'possible' worlds.