more from John P. Burgess

Single Idea 15428

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox]

Full Idea

It is a common view that the liar sentence ('This very sentence is not true') is an instance of a truth-value gap (neither true nor false), but some dialethists cite it as an example of a truth-value glut (both true and false).

Gist of Idea

The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut'


John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.7)

Book Reference

Burgess,John P.: 'Philosophical Logic' [Princeton 2009], p.113

A Reaction

The defence of the glut view must be that it is true, then it is false, then it is true... Could it manage both at once?