more from John P. Burgess

Single Idea 15424

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or]

Full Idea

Gricean implicature theory might suggest that a disjunction is never assertable when a disjunct is (though actually the disjunction might be 'pertinent') - but the procedure is indispensable in mathematical practice.

Gist of Idea

Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths


John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.2)

Book Reference

Burgess,John P.: 'Philosophical Logic' [Princeton 2009], p.102

A Reaction

He gives an example of a proof in maths which needs it, and an unusual conversational occasion where it makes sense.