more from Robin Le Poidevin

Single Idea 15195

[catalogued under 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block]

Full Idea

If the future is unreal, future individuals are ontologically problematic. Any apparent obligations towards them cannot, it seems, have an object.

Gist of Idea

If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals


Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 5)

Book Reference

'Questions of Time and Tense', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [OUP 2002], p.8

A Reaction

I certainly 'feel' obligations to the future, but I am not sure whether I 'have' them. How far into the future do the extend? Should I care if homo sapiens is replaced by a different dominant species?