more from Scott Soames

Single Idea 15154

[catalogued under 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions]

Full Idea

Instead of explaining the representationality of sentences and cognitive states in terms of propositions, we must explain the representationality of propositions in terms of the representationality of the relevant cognitive states.

Gist of Idea

We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa


Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)

Book Reference

Soames,Scott: 'Philosophy of Language' [Princeton 2010], p.3

A Reaction

Music to my ears. I am bewildered by this Russellian notion of a 'proposition' as some abstract entity floating around in the world waiting to be expressed. The vaguer word 'facts' (and false facts?) will cover that. It's Frege's fault.