more from Alvin Plantinga

Single Idea 14653

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties]

Full Idea

Socrates has P essentially if he has P in every world, or has it in every world in which he exists, or - most plausible of all - has P in the actual world and has its complement [non-P] in no world.

Gist of Idea

X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not P elsewhere)


Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], Intro)

Book Reference

Plantinga,Alvin: 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 2003], p.49

A Reaction

These strike me as mere necessary properties, which are not the same thing at all. Essences give rise to the other properties, but Plantinga offers nothing to do the job (and especially not 'Socrateity'!). Essences must explain, say I!