more from Robert Merrihew Adams

Single Idea 14511

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity]

Full Idea

I have argued that there are possible cases in which no purely qualitative conditions would be both necessary and sufficient for possessing a given thisness.

Gist of Idea

There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity


Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 6)

Book Reference

'Metaphysics - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 1999], p.181

A Reaction

Are we perhaps confusing our epistemology with our ontology here? We can ensure that something has identity, or ensure that its identity is knowable. If it is 'something', then it has identity. Er, that's it?

Related Idea

Idea 14512 Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]