more from Dorothy Edgington

Single Idea 14278

[catalogued under 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals]

Full Idea

There are compounds of conditionals which we confidently assert and accept which, by the lights of the truth-functionalist, we do not have reason to believe true, such as 'If it broke if it was dropped, it was fragile', when it is NOT dropped.

Gist of Idea

Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe


Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals (Stanf) [2006], 2.5)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.9

A Reaction

[The example is from Gibbard 1981] The fact that it wasn't dropped only negates the nested antecedent, not the whole antecedent. I suppose it also wasn't broken, and both negations seem to be required.