more from Dorothy Edgington

Single Idea 14276

[catalogued under 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals]

Full Idea

The truth-functional view of conditionals has the unhappy consequence that all conditionals with unlikely antecedents are likely to be true. To think it likely that ČA is to think it likely that a sufficient condition for the truth of A⊃B obtains.

Gist of Idea

The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true


Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals (Stanf) [2006], 2.3)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.7

A Reaction

This is Edgington's main reason for rejecting the truth-functional account of conditionals. She says it removes our power to discriminate between believable and unbelievable conditionals, which is basic to practical reasoning.