more from Allan Gibbard

Single Idea 14078

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity]

Full Idea

It is meaningless to talk of the same concrete thing in different possible worlds, ...but it makes sense to speak of the same individual concept, which is just a function which assigns to each possible world in a set an individual in that world.

Gist of Idea

Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds


Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII)

Book Reference

-: 'Journal of Symbolic Logic' [-], p.208

A Reaction

A lovely bold response to the problem of transworld identity, but one which needs investigation. It sounds very promising to me. 'Aristotle' is a cocept, not a name. There is no separate category of 'names'. Wow. (Attach dispositions to concepts?).