more from Brian Ellis

Single Idea 13571

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences]

Full Idea

My current view is that individual essences (about which Kripke's essentialism has a lot to say) do not matter much from the point of view of a scientific essentialist.

Gist of Idea

Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences


Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], Intro)

Book Reference

Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.11

A Reaction

[Kripke parenthesis on p.54] Presumably this is because science is only committed to dealing in generalities, and so natural kinds are needed for such things. I'm inclined to regard individual essences as prior in the pure ontology of the thing.