more from Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J

Single Idea 13102

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation]

Full Idea

If we go for the necessity-of-origins view, A and B are different if the origin of A is different from the origin of B. But one is left with the further question 'When is the origin of A distinct from the origin of B?'

Gist of Idea

If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves


Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)

Book Reference

Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J: 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' [CUP 1999], p.273

A Reaction

There may be an answer to this, in a regress of origins that support one another, but in the end the objection is obviously good. You can't begin to refer to an 'origin' if you can't identify anything in the first place.