more from Robert C. Stalnaker

Single Idea 12764

[catalogued under 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum]

Full Idea

If we are to make sense of the bare particular theory, a property must be not just a rule for grouping individuals, but a feature of individuals in virtue of which they may be grouped.

Gist of Idea

For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects


Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.76)

Book Reference

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.76

A Reaction

He is offering an objection to the thoroughly extensional account of properties that is found in standard possible worlds semantics. Quite right too. We can't give up on the common sense notion of a property.