more from Robert C. Stalnaker

Single Idea 12762

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism]

Full Idea

I argue that one cannot make semantical sense out of bare particular anti-essentialism within the framework of standard semantics for modal logic.

Gist of Idea

Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics


Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.71)

Book Reference

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.72

A Reaction

Stalnaker characterises the bare particular view as ANTI-essentialist, because he has defined essence in terms of necessary properties. The bare particular seems to allow the possibility of Aristotle being a poached egg.