more from Dorothy Edgington

Single Idea 12185

[catalogued under 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity]

Full Idea

Edgington's position is that logical necessity is an epistemic notion: epistemic necessity which, she claims, is the old notion of the a priori. Like Kripke, she thinks this is two-way independent of metaphysical necessity.

Gist of Idea

Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori

Source

report of Dorothy Edgington (Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility [1985]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues 1

Book Reference

-: 'Aristotelian Society' [], p.139


A Reaction

[her paper was unpublished] She hence thinks an argument can be logically valid, while metaphysically its conclusion may not follow. Dubious, though I think I favour the view that logical necessity is underwritten by metaphysical necessity.