more from Alvin Plantinga

Single Idea 11987

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts]

Full Idea

It makes no sense to say I could have been someone else, yet Counterpart Theory implies not merely that I could have been distinct from myself, but that I would have been distinct from myself had things gone differently in even the most miniscule detail.

Gist of Idea

Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently


Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II)

Book Reference

'The Possible and the Actual', ed/tr. Loux,Michael J. [Cornell 1979], p.163

A Reaction

A counterpart doesn't appear to be 'me being distinct from myself'. We have to combine counterparts over possible worlds with perdurance over time. I am a 'worm' of time-slices. Anything not in that worm is not strictly me.