more from George Molnar

Single Idea 11947

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic]

Full Idea

I propose a generalization: that all dispositional and extrinsic predicates that apply to an object, do so by virtue of intrinsic powers borne by the object.

Gist of Idea

Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects


George Molnar (Powers [1998], 6.3)

Book Reference

Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.109

A Reaction

This is the clearest statement of the 'powers' view of nature, and the one with which I agree. An interesting question is whether powers or objects are more basic in our ontology. Are objects just collections of causal powers? What has the power?