more from George Molnar

Single Idea 11918

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities]

Full Idea

Pre-theoretically it does not seem to be the case that what is essential to a thing includes everything that is necessarily true of that thing.

Gist of Idea

The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it


George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.4)

Book Reference

Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.37

A Reaction

This seems to me to be true. The simple point, which I take to be obvious, is that essential properties must at the very least be in some way important, whereas necessities can be trivial. I favour the idea that the essences create the necessities.