more from David Wiggins

Single Idea 11865

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind]

Full Idea

A thing could have a property only if its having the property could be conceived, and that requires some sortal concept which adequately answers the Aristotelian question what the thing is.

Gist of Idea

The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it


David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.5)

Book Reference

Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' [CUP 2001], p.121

A Reaction

[Algebra omitted!] The core idea of Wiggins's theory. It seems at first glance to be a revival of Aristotelian essentialism, but his view of that seems to merely involve falling into a category. He treats sortal concepts as Aristotle's 'primary being'.