more from Peter Geach

Single Idea 10732

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind]

Full Idea

If concepts were nothing but recognitional capacities, then it is unintelligible that I can judge that cats eat mice when neither of them are present.

Gist of Idea

If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible


Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.164)

Book Reference

'Knowledge and Mind', ed/tr. Ginet,C/Shoemaker,S [OUP 1983], p.164

A Reaction

Having observed the importance of recognition for the abstractionist (Idea 10731), he then seems to assume that there is nothing more to their concepts. Geach fails to grasp levels of abstraction, and cross-reference, and generalisation.

Related Idea

Idea 10731 For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach]