more from A.J. Ayer

Single Idea 5198

[catalogued under 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities]

Full Idea

It is possible to challenge the proposition 'a material thing cannot be in two places at once' empirically; if you destroy one object, the other should also instantly be destroyed if they are a single thing.

Gist of Idea

We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things


comment on A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2) by Virgil Ierubino - works

Book Reference

Ayer,A.J.: 'Language, Truth and Logic' [Penguin 1974], p.77

A Reaction

This leaves us having to decide whether the proposition is metaphysically necessary, or is empirical, or is tautological. This idea inclines me towards the view that it is empirical. Imagine two 'separate' objects which responded identically to stimuli.