more from Alfred Tarski

Single Idea 19197

[catalogued under 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth]

Full Idea

Truth can't be eliminated from universal statements saying all sentences of a certain type are true, or from the proof that 'all consequences of true sentences are true'. It is also needed if we can't name the sentence ('Plato's first sentence is true').

Gist of Idea

Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims


Alfred Tarski (The Semantic Conception of Truth [1944], 16)

Book Reference

'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Linsky,Leonard [University of Illinois 1972], p.31

A Reaction

This points to the deflationary view of truth, if its only role is in talking about other sentences in this way. Tarski gives the standard reason for rejecting the Redundancy view.