more from Edmund Husserl

Single Idea 22220

[catalogued under 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory]

Full Idea

In Husserl's phenomenology, the intentional object of a memory is the object of a past experience, which is intuitively given to me in the present, not, however, as being present but as being past.

Gist of Idea

The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past


report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.203

Book Reference

'A Companion to Continental Philosophy', ed/tr. Critchley,S/Schroeder,W [Blackwell 1999], p.203

A Reaction

I certainly don't have to assess my mental events, and judge which are past, which are now, and which are future imaginings. I suppose Fodor would say they are memories because we find them in the memory-box. How else could it work?