more from Lucretius

Single Idea 5697

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations]

Full Idea

If a belief resting directly on the foundation of the senses is not valid, there will be no standard to which we can refer any doubt on obscure questions for rational confirmation.

Gist of Idea

The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses


Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.422)

Book Reference

Lucretius: 'On the Nature of the Universe', ed/tr. Latham,Ronald [Penguin 1951], p.40

A Reaction

A classic statement of empiricist foundationalism. The Epicureans don't appear to have any time for a priori truths at all. I wonder if they settled mathematical disputes by counting objects and drawing diagrams?