Ideas of R.D. Ingthorsson, by Theme
[Swedish, fl. 2021, Professor at University of Helsinki.]
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
22611
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Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
22609
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Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
22629
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Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
22633
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Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image
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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
22606
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Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
22631
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Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
22632
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Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
22627
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Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
22613
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Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
22612
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Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time
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22625
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Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
22620
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If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
22636
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Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless
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22638
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Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
22605
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Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations
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22607
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Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
22621
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Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions
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22608
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Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes
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22614
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Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
22639
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Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction
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22615
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One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist
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22616
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Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions
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22617
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Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional
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22619
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Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
22635
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People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause
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22634
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Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals
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22637
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Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
22624
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A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
22622
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Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics
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27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
22618
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In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes
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27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
22630
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If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
22610
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It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic
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