Ideas of Robert Hanna, by Theme
[American, fl. 2006, Professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder.]
green numbers give full details |
back to list of philosophers |
expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
11051
|
Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition
|
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
11054
|
Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences
|
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
11088
|
We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies
|
11071
|
'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ
|
11070
|
'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ
|
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
11059
|
Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible
|
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
11089
|
Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology
|
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
11058
|
Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals
|
11072
|
Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core
|
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
11061
|
Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts
|
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
11063
|
Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
11055
|
Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11083
|
A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
11086
|
Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences)
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
11084
|
Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11085
|
Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws
|
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
11077
|
Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences
|
11080
|
Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception
|
11078
|
Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
11053
|
Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction
|
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
11081
|
Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions
|
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
11082
|
Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery?
|
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
11067
|
Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity
|
11047
|
Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence
|
11068
|
One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic
|
11046
|
Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths
|
11048
|
Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths
|
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
11045
|
Most psychologists are now cognitivists
|