Ideas of J Baggini / PS Fosl, by Theme
[British, fl. 2003, Baggini is the editor of 'Philosophy Now']
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
4643
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The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
4633
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You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it
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2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
4635
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Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts
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4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
4631
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In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use
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4632
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'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
4638
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The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin'
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
4640
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If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [PG]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
4647
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'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4639
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Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
4646
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Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori?
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
4645
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'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
4582
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Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
4644
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A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified
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14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
4584
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The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature
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14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
4583
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How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction?
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
4634
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Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness
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4637
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To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
4629
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Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality
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