Ideas of J.P. Moreland, by Theme

[American, fl. 2001, Biola University, California]

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor

4456	Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence

4474	Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

4461	Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes

4462	A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex

4463	In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

4451	If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties?

4453	One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem

4464	Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals

4449	Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals

4450	The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals

4454	The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals

4452	Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties

4468	How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space?

4467	A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary

4469	There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms

4472	Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism

4459	Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

4458	Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism

4457	There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism

4471	We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

4476	Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind

4460	Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts

4455	It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism

4473	'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists