Ideas of Ross P. Cameron, by Theme

[British, fl. 2008, Lecturer at University of Leeds, and St Andrew's.]

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists
Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths?
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature
One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths
We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist!
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings
An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange'
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended?