Ideas of Philippa Foot, by Theme

[British, 1920 - 2010, At Somerville College, Oxford University.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
22396 We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual
22496 Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
22397 Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
22462 We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
22449 When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people'
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
22371 Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
23438 Full rationality must include morality
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
22480 Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality
23437 Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
22372 Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive
22393 I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23436 It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
22481 There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [PG]
22482 I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
22384 A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable
22385 The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended
22386 Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it
22387 Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse
22388 Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow
22466 We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences
22467 Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it
22465 We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
4692 It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable
4694 Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22377 Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value
22376 To reject the fact-value distinction, no evidence can count in favour of rightness or wrongness
22378 We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed
22487 Moral arguments are grounded in human facts
22491 Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning
23434 There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark'
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
22447 Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
22452 Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it?
23439 Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23435 If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?'
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / i. Successful function
22381 Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
22379 The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
22458 Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness
22460 Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad?
22461 Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions
22464 The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
22497 Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life
22498 Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
22445 Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
22444 A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
22392 Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable'
22451 All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22485 Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
22474 Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
23431 Human defects are just like plant or animal defects
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
22477 Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings
22486 The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
22375 Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad'
22492 Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees
22493 Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not
23433 Humans need courage like a plant needs roots
23432 Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
22470 A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
22499 We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
22402 Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions
23145 Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Driver]
22401 Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
22398 Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation
22478 The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
22468 Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22373 People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing
22495 Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
22456 Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
22469 Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
22403 Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
22472 The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality
22479 Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
22400 Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
22391 Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
22389 Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does
22395 Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
22448 We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
22463 Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
22459 For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22502 Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
4693 The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive')
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
22383 Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights
22446 In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
22380 Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function