Ideas of John Kekes, by Theme

[American, fl. 1993, Professor at New York State University.]

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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
20146 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
23101 Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20169 An action may be intended under one description, but not under another
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20149 To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
23086 Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions
23100 Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
20150 There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities
20156 We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to
20158 Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality
20159 Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations
20161 The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals)
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
20151 Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable
20152 Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done
20153 Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / f. Love
23117 Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object
23119 Sentimental love distorts its object
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23097 What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
20157 Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values
20154 Control is the key to well-being
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
19738 Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control
20145 Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
23096 Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones
23095 Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience?
23094 Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy
23087 Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous
23089 Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation
23093 Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct
23098 Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree
20170 Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
20165 Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology
20171 Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is
20175 If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23088 Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil
23090 Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good
20162 Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
20174 Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
23099 It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
23118 Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
20173 Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting
20172 Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
20155 Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
23109 The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
23114 The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life
20163 Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program
20164 The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past...
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
23116 Citizenship is easier than parenthood
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
23103 Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
23107 Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
23081 Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
23085 The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy
23092 Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
23102 Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
23084 Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
23082 Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors
23079 Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice
23091 Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic?
23112 Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
23106 To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives
23121 It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
23105 It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires
23120 The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality
20148 Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
23108 Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
23083 Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
23113 Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations