Ideas of Gilbert Harman, by Theme
[American, b.1938, Professor at Princeton University.]
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
3099
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Inference is never a conscious process
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19304
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The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic
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19307
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If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it
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19309
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Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate
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19306
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It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities
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6950
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You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
3077
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Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge
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19303
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Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
12596
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Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence
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12599
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Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them
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6954
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A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
3092
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If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
3093
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Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction
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12595
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We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
3098
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Deductive logic is the only logic there is
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
3094
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You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
3084
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Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts
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3080
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Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements
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3081
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A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12597
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I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
12598
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Reality is the overlap of true complete theories
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
19305
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The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence
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19310
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High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
19308
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We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
3100
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You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
3089
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Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic
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3088
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Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination
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12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
3101
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Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
3074
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People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
3097
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We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
6369
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In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Pollock/Cruz]
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19311
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In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence
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19312
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Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
3096
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Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
8800
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If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Sosa]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
6955
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Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation
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14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
3095
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Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
6952
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Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it
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14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
6953
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All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
17060
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Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Smart]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
12602
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There is no natural border between inner and outer
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12603
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We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
8130
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Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Burge]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
12601
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The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
3073
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We see ourselves in the world as a map
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
3076
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Defining dispositions is circular
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
3075
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Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern?
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
6951
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Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3086
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Are there any meanings apart from in a language?
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
12592
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Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
3078
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Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
12593
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The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences
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12590
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Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
12588
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Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality
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12589
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Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter
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12600
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The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
3090
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There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
3082
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Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
3079
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Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
3085
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Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
3087
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The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary
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19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
12594
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If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one?
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
12591
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Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3083
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Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
5121
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Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
5122
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Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5120
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What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
5123
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Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it
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5124
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If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait
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5125
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Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character
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