Ideas of Richard M. Hare, by Theme
[British, 1919 - 2002, Professor at Oxford University.]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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16050
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The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good
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22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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2705
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How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones?
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2712
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You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate
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22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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2706
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Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons
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22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
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2855
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In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hooker,B]
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22331
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Moral statements are imperatives rather than to avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Glock]
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22484
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Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Foot]
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4125
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Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Williams,B]
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4126
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If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B]
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4127
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If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B]
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22483
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A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on
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2703
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Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation
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2707
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If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved
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2708
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An 'ought' statement implies universal application
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2709
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Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable
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2711
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Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't
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2704
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If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism
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23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
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4360
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By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
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2710
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Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
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6449
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The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Nagel]
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