Ideas of Richard M. Hare, by Theme

[British, 1919 - 2002, Professor at Oxford University.]

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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones?
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hooker,B]
Moral statements are imperatives rather than to avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Glock]
Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Foot]
Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Williams,B]
If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B]
If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B]
A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved
An 'ought' statement implies universal application
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Nagel]