Ideas of Ian Hacking, by Theme
[Canadian, b.1936, At theUniversity of Toronto, and at Stanford University.]
green numbers give full details |
back to list of philosophers |
expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
7454
|
Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher
|
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
13838
|
A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics
|
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
13833
|
'Thinning' ('dilution') is the key difference between deduction (which allows it) and induction
|
13834
|
Gentzen's Cut Rule (or transitivity of deduction) is 'If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C'
|
13835
|
Only Cut reduces complexity, so logic is constructive without it, and it can be dispensed with
|
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
13845
|
The various logics are abstractions made from terms like 'if...then' in English
|
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
13844
|
A limitation of first-order logic is that it cannot handle branching quantifiers
|
13840
|
First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with Löwenheim-Skolem
|
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
13842
|
Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
13837
|
With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
13839
|
Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers
|
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
13843
|
If it is a logic, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it
|
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
7447
|
Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812
|
7448
|
Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence)
|
7449
|
Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
7450
|
In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence
|
7451
|
Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence
|
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
7452
|
An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [PG]
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
7459
|
Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths
|