Ideas of David M. Armstrong, by Theme

[Australian, 1926 - 2014, Born in Melbourne. Pupil of John Anderson. Taught at Sydney University.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
18390 All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
17663 If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4036 What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Mellor/Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18467 Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality
18468 Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
15547 Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Lewis]
18377 Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth
18382 The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
18384 One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory
18386 What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'?
18387 The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination
18394 In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
18381 Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15544 If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
18396 The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
18393 For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
18392 Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
18385 Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
8507 Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
18391 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
9497 Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
17688 Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
18374 Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
17691 Nothing is genuinely related to itself
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
7024 Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Heil]
17679 All instances of some property are strictly identical
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15754 Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature
18372 We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18378 Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates'
18379 The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Bird]
12677 Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4034 Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature
8535 To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive
4444 One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
18373 If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
8538 Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact
4445 If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
18400 Properties are not powers - they just have powers
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14330 To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible
17667 Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties
17687 If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers
18397 Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result
18399 How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8506 Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation
17678 Universals are just the repeatable features of a world
4448 Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
10729 Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Oliver]
4032 The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type'
17669 Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena
8539 Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
17677 Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated
17686 Universals are abstractions from states of affairs
15442 Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
4446 It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
4442 Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
8505 Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8529 Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties
4439 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
4440 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4031 It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property
8530 Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold'
8536 We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates
4431 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
4433 Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive
4432 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members
4435 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members
4434 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things)
4436 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones
18371 The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
4437 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things
4438 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
17668 It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
18389 When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
10024 The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Hodes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Oliver]
17680 The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
15542 All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
17693 The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4743 The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
11003 The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18388 Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
6498 Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Robinson,H]
7440 Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
3900 Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
4253 Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
17685 Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
17683 Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal
17675 Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
17674 The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17672 A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
17684 To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
17676 Best explanations explain the most by means of the least
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
7437 Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18375 General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5690 A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
7434 Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7436 The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
5493 If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Lycan]
4600 Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Heil]
7429 Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
7438 A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7431 The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7432 One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
17664 Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
8533 Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply
4035 There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18368 For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature
18370 A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
17692 We can't deduce the phenomena from the One
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
17689 Absences might be effects, but surely not causes?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
18380 Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
17662 Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces
17682 A universe couldn't consist of mere laws
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
17690 Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [PG]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
17670 Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
8582 Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Lewis]
17671 A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible
8541 Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability
8540 The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue'
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
17681 The laws of nature link properties with properties
16246 Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin]
9480 Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
5492 How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
18401 The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced