Ideas of Graeme Forbes, by Theme
[American, fl. 1995, Professor at Tulane University.]
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
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12027
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There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory
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4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
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12005
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The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)'
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
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12010
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Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules?
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
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12023
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Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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12017
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In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
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12024
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If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock.
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
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11885
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Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Mackie,P]
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12014
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An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have
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12015
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Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
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12013
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Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
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13804
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A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property
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13805
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Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
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12012
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Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist
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13808
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A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
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13806
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Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
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13807
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A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
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12025
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Artefacts have fuzzy essences
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12022
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Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact
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13809
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One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
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12020
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An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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11888
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Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Mackie,P]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
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12003
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De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
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12028
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De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is
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13810
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The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
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12008
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Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them
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12009
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The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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12007
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Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
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12011
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Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things
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12016
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The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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12004
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Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
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12021
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Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness
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12029
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We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual
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