Ideas of Alexander Miller, by Theme
[British, fl. 1998, Taught at Birmingham University, then at Macquarie University, Sydney.]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
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If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
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Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
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Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
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Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together?
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
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If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
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'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
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Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth
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The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true
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22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval
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