Ideas of Howard Robinson, by Theme

[British, fl. 1994, Liverpool University, and then the Central European University, Budapest.]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas

---

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism

6504	For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties

6520	If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features?

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism

6485	When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism

6521	Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world

6509	Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

6522	Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century)

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception

6502	Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition?

6513	Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking?

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

6512	Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities

6497	We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities

6494	If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured

6499	Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way

6500	If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities?

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation

6484	Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

6508	Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data

6482	For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects

6480	Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

6505	Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory

6506	'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse

6507	Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects

6511	If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation

6515	An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained

6517	If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality

6481	If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind

6503	Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension

6519	Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined