Ideas of Frank Jackson, by Theme

[Australian, b.1943, Professor at the Australian National University.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Schroeter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic?
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Edgington]
The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Edgington]
There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Edgington]
When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth
(A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T
Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions
Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry]
Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry]
Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau]
No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett]
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water'
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.?
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide