Ideas of Harry G. Frankfurt, by Theme
[American, b.1929, At Yale University, then at Princeton University.]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
9240
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Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264
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Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires
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9266
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A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267
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Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265
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The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015
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Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Wilson/Schpall]
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22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9232
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It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance
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9234
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If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything
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22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
9233
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Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem
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9229
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What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little
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22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / f. Love
9235
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Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them
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9236
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Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object
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9237
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The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants
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9239
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I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake
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22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
9227
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We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient
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22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
9230
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People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained
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22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
9228
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Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important
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22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270
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A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions
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9269
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A person may be morally responsible without free will
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22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
9238
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Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality
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23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
9241
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Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life
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23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9300
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Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival
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25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
9231
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Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices
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