Ideas of David Lewis, by Theme

[American, 1941 - 2001, Pupil of Willard Quine. Professor at Princeton University.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
16281 Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21461 I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
16288 Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge)
15545 Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
8605 In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
15457 Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
15527 Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
3993 Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
10845 To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
9651 Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact
15557 Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10847 Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15546 Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
15548 Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
15549 If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker?
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
14399 Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
10846 Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
16456 For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
18395 Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Armstrong]
15496 We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton
10807 Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
15499 A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member
15500 Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
15503 We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality!
15498 We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything
15502 There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set
10809 We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members
10812 The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality
10811 The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
15497 We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology)
15506 If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes
15511 If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another?
15513 Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso?
10813 What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element?
10814 Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates?
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
15507 Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it
10191 Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [MacBride]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
15508 If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets
15514 A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory
15523 Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10806 Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
10816 We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15533 We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
15731 Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes')
15518 I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic
15525 Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15534 We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
14212 A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
10808 Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
15524 Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
15517 Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
15515 To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10815 We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
15532 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15789 Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan]
10470 There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Oliver]
15535 We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist
15520 Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
14401 Every proposition is entirely about being
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15540 You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times)
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
15561 The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation
15565 Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence
15567 Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges
15566 Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
15564 An event is a property of a unique space-time region
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
8607 Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability
3990 The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
9650 Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3991 Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
8606 A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
16210 Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
15501 We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture
15504 Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
14213 Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
8580 Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Fictionalism
8909 Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. States of Affairs
15543 How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9057 Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express
9671 Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision
16458 Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language
15538 Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about)
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
8571 Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around
15735 Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them
9656 The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy
15751 Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15737 To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14979 Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Sider]
15454 Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling'
15742 A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic
15397 If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron]
15398 Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron]
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate
15741 All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties
15400 We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Cameron]
15458 A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates
15459 Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
10717 Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Oliver]
16217 Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Hawley]
8585 Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties
8613 Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated
8586 Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains
8589 For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes
15460 All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis]
15726 Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals
14996 Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity...
15743 Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular
15744 We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance
15740 I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world
16262 Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Maudlin]
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world
15752 We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Heil]
8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18433 There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify
8604 We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions
15739 There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets
15563 Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
14499 Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Koslicki]
4038 Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Mellor/Oliver]
15399 The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Cameron]
9653 It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances
15732 Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set
15733 Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances
15734 If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too
10723 A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Oliver]
9655 Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds
16290 I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals
15516 A property is any class of possibilia
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
9657 You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
15749 Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates
15748 Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes
15750 Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
9476 If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15120 Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Hawthorne]
15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property?
15463 All dispositions must have causal bases
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
15461 A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8569 I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done
15745 Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common
15746 If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle
15453 The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
21961 Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Moore,AW]
15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
15747 Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8576 The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches)
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8570 To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things
8574 Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
15455 Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
15537 If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
15536 We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples
14748 The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical
6129 Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14210 A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints
15512 In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms
15519 Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power
15521 Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality
15522 The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
9667 Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum
13268 There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Sider]
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times
14244 Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley]
10660 A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it
10566 Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Fine,K]
10810 I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13793 An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Elder]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
9663 A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
14737 Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
9664 Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape
9665 There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19280 I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15968 Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15969 Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
16079 De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Rudder Baker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
15560 We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
14283 A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14361 Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
8434 In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Horwich]
8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality
15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
9660 The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
9669 There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
16132 On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported
16133 Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
16283 For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself
12255 For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg]
9219 Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Sider]
15022 If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider]
10469 A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
15790 Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan]
15791 What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan]
18415 The actual world is just the world you are in [Cappelen/Dever]
16441 Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Stalnaker]
16282 Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16284 Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
16286 Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing
16287 Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together
9662 Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
7690 If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election
15530 A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts
14404 The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Merricks]
5440 A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Mautner]
5441 Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner]
16291 In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11903 Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Mackie,P]
15129 Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity
9670 Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
16392 A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Recanati]
12899 The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
12897 To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
15509 Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
12898 Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
16279 General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
12895 Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Cohen,S]
19562 We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Cohen,S]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
15528 A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what
15526 There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand
15529 It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible
15531 The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
9661 Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
9652 To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
15559 Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
15556 Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
15558 A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
9658 An explanation tells us how an event was caused
4809 Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Psillos]
16280 Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories
14321 To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
16274 If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
3995 A mind is an organ of representation
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
8209 Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
8424 Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
7441 Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states
7442 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain
7444 Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7445 The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent
8579 Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism
3994 Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7443 A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
18416 Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3992 Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
16390 Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Recanati]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3996 Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3998 If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs
3997 Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority
3999 A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs
4000 Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
8901 Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8904 The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
8938 The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers?
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
8903 Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets
8902 If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations
8906 If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes
8905 If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
8908 For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction
8907 The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it
15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
16289 We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18418 A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
16278 A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications)
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
8420 A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true
9654 A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property
15736 A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true
15738 Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
8614 A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth
8615 We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity
15539 Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
15562 Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
15555 Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8405 A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Field,H]
8427 I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted
8433 There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Horwich]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
10392 It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause
8419 The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions
15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right'
15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8421 Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
17525 The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Bird]
8426 One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second
17524 Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Bird]
8397 Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley]
8423 My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations
8608 Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past
8584 Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption
9659 Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either
15553 Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
15727 Physics aims for a list of natural properties
8581 Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
9423 If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford]
9424 A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford]
9409 Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Mumford]
9419 A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength
9425 Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford]
8611 A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4398 An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Psillos]
4795 Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
9426 The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
9666 It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / j. Time travel
23019 The interesting time travel is when personal and external time come apart [Baron/Miller]
23021 Lewis said it might just be that travellers to the past can't kill their grandfathers [Baron/Miller]