Ideas of Paul Horwich, by Theme

[British, b.1947, At University College, London, and New York University.]

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2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition?
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth?
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Davidson]
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E)
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around