Ideas of Ernest Sosa, by Theme

[American, b.1940, Professor at Brown University, Long Island. Visiting Professor at Rutgers University.]

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

8797	The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent

8877	We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism

8884	The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts

8443	Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

8878	It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching

12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism

8880	In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

8881	Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense

8794	There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations

8882	Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts

8883	Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience?

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations

8885	Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations

8796	A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not

8876	Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique

8799	If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations

8795	Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

8879	Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification

8798	Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation

8442	What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

8444	Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall?

8445	The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator