Ideas of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, by Theme

[American, fl. 1995, At Loyola University, Marymount; then at the University of Oklahoma.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Whitcomb]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding
Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap
Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked
We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth
Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue
A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them
Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples)
We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices
A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues
A virtue must always have a corresponding vice
Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [PG]
Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends
Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having