Ideas of Immanuel Kant, by Theme

[German, 1724 - 1804, Born and died at Königsberg, on the Baltic. Professor at the University there.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
5540 Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked
6200 Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it
21422 Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
21955 My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
6207 What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
5631 Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes
6184 Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher
21406 Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
5635 In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
16931 Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic
21954 Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
5586 The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches
7918 Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Macdonald,C]
21438 Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects)
16611 You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21462 It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Gardner]
5600 Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system
21457 Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
9752 Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Korsgaard]
6584 A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Fogelin]
9349 A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted)
3722 Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples
6203 Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
21408 For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
12767 Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
9350 Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects
18259 Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts
5530 Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
5604 In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary
5623 If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part
5622 The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori
21416 Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
5578 Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects
5628 Reason hates to be limited in its speculations
5603 Pure reason exists outside of time
5616 Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects
21054 Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
21439 Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination
5584 All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical
18236 Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Korsgaard]
3738 The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
5563 The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time
5565 Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
5602 The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
5618 Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries
18261 A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
5619 No a priori concept can be defined
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
22274 'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Potter]
5577 Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
5555 Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
5539 We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
5620 Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
18794 Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
22275 Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
5542 There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
21454 The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
16918 Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
8739 Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Shapiro]
16919 Geometry rests on our intuition of space
16930 Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality
8740 Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition
16899 Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
16920 Numbers are formed by addition of units in time
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
16929 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
9632 Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
3343 Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
8737 Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Shapiro]
5557 Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
12421 Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher]
16910 Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure
16917 All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17617 Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
16928 Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
12458 Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Hilbert]
2795 If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Dancy,J]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
4475 Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
7416 Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
19386 Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear
21445 Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
21448 Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced
5554 Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
6160 Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
17772 Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Bayne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
5533 Objects in themselves are not known to us at all
21449 The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
5550 A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
5564 Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change
21451 All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
11833 The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
5626 An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
7576 The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Jolley]
14509 If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
18797 Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
5594 Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
18795 A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible)
5566 Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary?
5613 The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction
21410 That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
6181 Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
18796 Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
14710 Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Schroeter]
16256 For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Maudlin]
5524 Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience
23461 Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Morris,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
20944 Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Bowie]
21957 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know
5617 Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
15627 Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Hegel]
16898 Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Burge]
5573 Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
5634 Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
5590 'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise)
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
5601 There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
22003 We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Pinkard]
21456 Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner]
21446 If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
16923 I admit there are bodies outside us
6910 Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Feuerbach]
6909 In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Feuerbach]
21440 For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Gardner]
22006 The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Pinkard]
21441 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience
21442 'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode
5568 We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances
5581 We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves
21956 Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism)
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
21971 Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9156 Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge]
7575 A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Jolley]
12414 A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience
9351 One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9348 Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
21081 We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
5404 Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell]
9345 Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities
16893 The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Burge]
9347 A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3342 Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Benardete,JA]
20943 Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Bowie]
5402 Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Russell]
5203 We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer]
16916 A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves
5527 That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity
5528 That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic
5529 The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?
5537 That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition
5546 Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object?
5558 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination
5624 We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience
3726 The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
5571 Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
5403 If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
5525 No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
18262 For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa]
16915 A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses
5526 With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
16914 A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility
5567 A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
18264 We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
21447 I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object
5532 Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
16924 I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
16913 I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
2774 Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
23454 Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
5569 We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
22005 Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Pinkard]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
6577 For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Fogelin]
16925 Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
5538 Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity
5559 Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
8736 Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Shapiro]
16911 Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
18260 If we knew what we know, we would be astonished
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
5541 A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
7070 Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Critchley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
4708 Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
5595 Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions
5592 Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
6578 For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Fogelin]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
5629 If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
15308 Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
5606 Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
4086 Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
2869 Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche]
5572 Reason has logical and transcendental faculties
9346 Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
22443 We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
21421 Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
5627 I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
9751 To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Korsgaard]
21450 Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5583 We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5570 Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5551 I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21452 I can only determine my existence in time via external things
5582 As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
2965 For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Lockwood]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
5549 Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
5596 We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself
3739 Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
21053 The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature
3741 We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
9756 We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Korsgaard]
5597 If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing
3740 We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
5296 Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Marx/Engels]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
5585 Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
5630 Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative
5589 Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
5556 A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
8687 Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Friend]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Categories of Understanding
5552 Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances
21759 Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Houlgate]
19655 Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Meillassoux]
5544 Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality
5547 The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
17616 Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind
5553 Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible
5593 Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
22004 Concepts are rules for combining representations [Pinkard]
5543 All human cognition is through concepts
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
16912 Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
8735 Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Shapiro]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
8734 Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro]
7314 How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A]
16926 Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject
16927 Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject
20291 If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic
20292 Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
6183 Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant?
6191 The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
6190 The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil
21059 General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
12157 Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
20346 The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Wollheim]
18547 Only rational beings can experience beauty [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
20408 With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter
20409 When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody
20411 Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
22711 The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Murdoch]
4025 Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Taylor,C]
20412 Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
22046 The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Pinkard]
21458 The sublime is a moral experience [Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
5643 Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Scruton]
20410 The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
20160 Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
5576 We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9749 Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Korsgaard]
7671 Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Berlin]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18675 Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi]
22007 An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Pinkard]
18234 The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Korsgaard]
6192 Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil
18239 What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Korsgaard]
18238 Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose
21431 The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole
21437 All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
21455 We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / e. Altruism
3717 Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love
3720 We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / f. Love
21429 The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
3712 A good will is not good because of what it achieves
3725 The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences
6197 Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
6193 Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence
1452 Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
1454 Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness
21061 Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
5599 Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty
21415 Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
8024 The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre]
5074 Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R]
18235 Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22390 Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
6196 People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous
21409 Moral principles do not involve feelings
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
9750 We must only value what others find acceptable [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
3733 The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
22442 If lies were ever acceptable, with would undermine all duties based on contract
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
3736 Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends
6194 The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions
6198 Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good
21411 A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end
21413 Virtue is strong maxims for duty
21414 The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
3544 Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
1456 Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law
21436 We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
21419 If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
21417 How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims
21420 If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
21418 There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
7674 Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Berlin]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
21029 Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Sandel]
21425 We can love without respect, and show respect without love
21426 Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance
21428 Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right
21430 Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends
21427 Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons
21434 We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
20715 It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty
7105 If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Statman]
7625 We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam]
3715 Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings
3737 The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself
3710 The only purely good thing is a good will
4024 Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3724 A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake
3723 There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law
3735 Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal
6695 Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Graham]
8028 Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre]
3718 Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience
3714 Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed
5295 Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Marx/Engels]
21060 It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible
22441 The law will protect you if you tell a truth which results in murder
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
8026 Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre]
6185 No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death
6187 Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
15673 The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Finlayson]
8068 Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe]
8025 The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre]
3762 Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill]
8027 I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre]
3728 Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [PG]
22008 Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means
22009 Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends
3716 Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law
4413 The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche]
3719 If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible
3727 Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
22050 The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Bowie]
6694 Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only
3731 Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself
6201 Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
5605 Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed
5632 Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide
4345 For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Hursthouse]
3711 Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness
4251 If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B]
16004 If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard]
4344 Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth
3713 The function of reason is to produce a good will
3729 Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them
6186 A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law
6195 Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will
21062 The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
6916 For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Feuerbach]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
21435 Man is both social, and unsociable
21412 Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
21075 The state of nature always involves the threat of war
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
3732 Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means
21071 There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights
21082 A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
21063 Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share
21068 There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions
21069 A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept
20569 Kant made the social contract international and cosmopolitan [Oksala]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
21070 A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it
21079 The a priori general will of a people shows what is right
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
21077 Each nation should, from self-interest, join an international security constitution
21078 A constitution must always be improved when necessary
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
21067 A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
21089 Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
21086 Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
21064 A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
5575 An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens
21055 Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint
21056 The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others)
21080 Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
21083 Women have no role in politics
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
21058 Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
7670 Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Berlin]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
5621 The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 3. Legal equality
21076 Equality is where you cannot impose a legal obligation you yourself wouldn't endure
21407 Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
21066 Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
20570 There is now a growing universal community, and violations of rights are felt everywhere
20571 There are political and inter-national rights, but also universal cosmopolitan rights
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
21065 You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts!
21084 In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
21090 If someone has largely made something, then they own it
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
21057 The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence
21087 Human life is pointless without justice
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
7591 Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
21088 Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
7673 Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Berlin]
21433 Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
21072 The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
21073 Hiring soldiers is to use them as instruments, ignoring their personal rights
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
21074 Some trust in the enemy is needed during wartime, or peace would be impossible
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
21085 The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
19739 The maxim for suicide is committed to the value of life, and is thus contradictory
6188 A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
3730 Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends
21423 Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons
21424 Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
22052 Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie]
8256 Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [McDowell]
22053 The Critique of Judgement aims for a principle that unities humanity and nature [Bowie]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
5591 Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose
18237 Without men creation would be in vain, and without final purpose
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
5615 Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
14560 A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
5545 Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
9755 The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Korsgaard]
17709 We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Mares]
5562 Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
5523 Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
19669 For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Meillassoux]
19672 Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
17736 We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation
5531 Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence
16922 Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
16921 If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left
5536 If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
5534 One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
5560 The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity
5535 That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
5561 If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
5633 We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties
8046 We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [MacIntyre]
3721 We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection
6199 Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
5607 Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori)
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
8451 Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Orenstein]
13732 Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
3321 Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA]
5608 Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic?
5609 If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence
5610 If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction
5611 Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept
5612 You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
20714 God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Davies,B]
1453 We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality
1455 Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [PG]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
5598 If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end
6205 To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
6204 Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you
6206 From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
6202 In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left