Ideas of Sextus Empiricus, by Theme
[Greek, 140 - 200, Probably a doctor.]
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
1887
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You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
22764
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Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
22752
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Reasoning is impossible without a preconception
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2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
1885
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Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
6021
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It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
12196
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A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood'
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
6020
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'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal'
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
1902
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Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
22744
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Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
22762
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Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
1889
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If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
1871
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Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
1883
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How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects?
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12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
22748
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Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
1890
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We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
22759
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Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
20795
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Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
22760
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Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
1870
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The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
1873
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If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape
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1872
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The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand
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1882
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The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing
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1881
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The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
20794
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How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1874
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How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved?
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
1878
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Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin
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1879
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Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight
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1877
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If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities
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1880
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Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk
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1876
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If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
1910
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With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble
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1911
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Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
6026
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How can you investigate without some preconception of your object?
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
1886
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If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
22746
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If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
22741
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The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
1884
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If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
22763
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We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing
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22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
22754
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Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it
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22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
22755
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Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone
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22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
22756
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If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it
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23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 9. Contractualism
6032
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Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
1517
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The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature'
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
1894
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Some say that causes are physical, some say not
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
1896
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If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything
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1897
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Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular
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1898
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Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
1895
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Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly
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27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
1901
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If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity
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22747
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A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place
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1899
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Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front?
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1900
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If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
1903
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If motion and rest are abolished, so is time
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
1904
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Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
22749
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Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
22750
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Time is divisible, into past, present and future
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1905
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How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another?
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
22742
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Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death)
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22751
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If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist
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28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
22730
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All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good
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22739
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God must suffer to understand suffering
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1891
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How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place?
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28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
22738
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The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed
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28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
22734
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God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations
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28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
22736
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God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God
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22740
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God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God
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1892
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The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration
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28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
22735
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The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause
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28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
22732
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The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind
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28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
22728
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Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions
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22737
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An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God
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29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
22731
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It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods
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29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
1893
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If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things?
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