Ideas of James O. Young, by Theme
[Canadian, fl. 2013, Professor at the University of Victoria, Canada.]
green numbers give full details |
back to list of philosophers |
expand these ideas
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
|
19079
|
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct
|
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
|
19077
|
Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another
|
|
19076
|
Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere
|
|
19078
|
Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs?
|
|
19084
|
Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe
|
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
|
19083
|
How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere?
|
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
|
19075
|
Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions
|
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
|
19074
|
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)?
|
|
19082
|
Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification
|