Ideas of Barbara Vetter, by Theme

[German, fl. 2014, Studied at Oxford. At Humbolt University, Berlin.]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19023 Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
19033 Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
19032 S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
19036 The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
19034 The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
19015 Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
19012 The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
19024 A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)?
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
19021 I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
19016 We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
19017 Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
19014 How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19030 Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
19040 We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
19008 The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
19029 It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality
19028 Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
19010 All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
19013 Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
23705 A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
19009 Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
19019 Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
19027 Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
19031 There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
19025 Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
19022 Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
19011 If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
19037 Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
19018 Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
19020 Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
19039 The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
19038 Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
17993 Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
19026 If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
19041 Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions