Ideas of Arthur Schopenhauer, by Theme

[German, 1788 - 1860, Born in Danzig. Educated in France and Britain. Taught at the University of Berlin. Retired in 1831, and settled in Frankfurt.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
21916 Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
4171 Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else
4186 Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
12171 Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
21366 Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
21474 Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
21918 Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Lewis,PB]
4187 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?')
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
4168 Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21470 For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
21926 Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Lewis,PB]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
4167 The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
21920 No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Lewis,PB]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
21362 Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Janaway]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4192 All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
4190 All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
21479 Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
4165 Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
21361 For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Janaway]
21923 Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB]
4162 The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it
21922 We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21919 Object for a subject and representation are the same thing
21913 Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
21476 A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
4164 Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
4163 All perception is intellectual
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
21473 All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
21917 The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Lewis,PB]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4166 A consciousness without an object is no consciousness
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
21369 We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity
21478 Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
4191 What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will
21367 I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
21368 The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
4175 It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
4176 We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
4170 Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character
21477 We don't control our own thinking
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
21921 Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Lewis,PB]
21475 All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
4169 Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
7187 Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche]
21365 Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action
21924 As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
4173 If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
21363 Motivation is causality seen from within
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
21372 Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
21370 Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Janaway]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
4182 A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will
21488 The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
21928 The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Lewis,PB]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
21927 Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Lewis,PB]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
4174 Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature
8116 The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Gardner]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
21380 The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
21374 We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
21378 We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
21375 Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational
21915 To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
21379 Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion
21483 Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
4181 Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
5649 Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
4177 Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
4185 Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
4183 Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
4172 Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
21371 We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
21466 Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
4184 Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
21484 A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
21482 The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty
21481 Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
21469 Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact
21480 Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
21485 The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
21486 Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
21487 The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
21471 If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
21467 Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable?
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
21376 Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
4179 The essence of nature is the will to life itself
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
4189 Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
4178 Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
4180 Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect
21472 Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
21468 The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible